Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 2

Article 7

January 1997

A Survey of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) as Interpreted by
the Courts: The Infringement Exemption Created
by the 1984 Patent Term Restoration Act
Samuel M. Kais

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Samuel M. Kais, A Survey of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) as Interpreted by the Courts: The Infringement Exemption Created by the 1984 Patent
Term Restoration Act, 13 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 575 (1997).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol13/iss2/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

A SURVEY OF 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) AS INTERPRETED
BY THE COURTS: THE INFRINGEMENT EXEMPTION
CREATED BY TLE 1984 PATENT TERM
RESTORATION ACT*
Samuel M. Kaist

TABLE OF CONTENTS

576
I. INTRODUCTION ...............................................................
577
II. BACKGROUND ......................................................................
578
I. SCOPEOF § 271(e)(1) ..............................................................
579
IV. ELIGIBILITY UNDER § 27 1(e)(1) ................................................

A. Infringer'sIntent To Commercialize Prior To Patent
579
Expiration.......................................................................
B. Public Disseminationof Clinical Data: Promotional
and FundraisingUses..................................................... 580
C. Demonstrations of Infringing Devices at Trade
582
Shows ..............................................................................
583
D. Foreign Uses...................................................................
V. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT iNLIGHT OF § 271(e)(1) ................... 585
587
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................

*

Copyright © 1996 Samuel M. Kais.

B.S. Biology, UCLA, 1991; J.D. with high tech certificate, Santa Clara University,
May 1997; over three years industrial experience, Genentech, Inc.; I would like to thank Margaret Chu for her comments and editing.

t

576

I.

COMPUTERIGHTECINOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 13

INTRODUCTION

In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act (PTR Act).' The purpose of this Act was to
encourage expenditure in the areas of pharmaceutical inventions
while simultaneously ensuring greater competition in these fields
immediately after relevant patents expire.2 By rectifying distortions
in the patent system created by the Food and Drug Administration's
(FDA's) regulatory approval process, Congress struck a balance between the interests of pharmaceutical companies and competing
"generic" manufacturers. The result was an exemption to patent infringement codified as § 271(e)(1) of the Patent Statute. This section
provides:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.3
The language of this exemption lends itself to interpretation towards which the courts have provided limited clarification. Many
questions have arisen with regards to eligibility, scope, disqualifying
activity, and procedural administration. It is crucial that these questions be answered. Misinterpretation of this legislation can cost a
company license fees, business opportunities, unnecessary litigation
expenses, and most importantly its patent protection.
This writing will explore the scope of § 271 (e)(1) as interpreted
by courts and the resulting effect upon corporate business and patent
practices.

1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585. The PTR Act is also referred to as the Waxman-Hatch exemption.
2. Amy Stark, The Exemption from PatentInfringement and Declaratory Judgments:
MisinterpretationofLegislative Intent?, 31 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 1057, 1059 (1994).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
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II. BACKGROUND

The 1984 Act was motivated by two distortions that were occurring to the standard 17-year patent term. Both of these distortions
were created by the long and arduous FDA approval required prior to
4
the marketing of any pharmaceutical products.
The first distortion was occurring because patentees complying
with the FDA requirements were being robbed of their full patent
term. While patentees were tied up in the regulatory process, the
clock was ticking on their patents. As a result they were deprived of
5
valuable sales time from the front end of their patent terms.
The second distortion came from the fact that once the original
patents expired, the lack of FDA approval precluded competitors
from entering the marketplace. Since regulatory approval inherently
entails the limited making, use, and sale of infringing products,
"generic" drug manufacturers. had to wait until patents expired before
seeking FDA approval. In effect, this inadvertently gave patentees
term extensions while their competitors were engaged in the long
6
regulatory process.
To restore to patentees the time lost from their patents, the PTR
established a patent-term extension for products that are subject to
lengthy pre-market regulatory delays.7 Codified as 35 U.S.C. § 156,
this section provides that patents relating to eligible products can be
extended up to five years if, inter alia, the product was "subject to a
regulatory review period before its commercial marketing or use,"
and "the permission for the commercial marketing or use of the
product after such regulatory review period was the first permitted
commercial marketing or use of the product under the provision of
law under which such regulatory review period occurred." 8

4. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661,662 (1990).
5. Id.

6. Id.
35 U.S.C. § 156(f) (1988) defnes eligible products:
(1) The term "product" means:
(A) A human drug product.
(B) Any medical device, food additive, or color additive subject to
regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
(2) The term "human drug product" means the active ingredient of a new drug,
antibiotic drug, or human biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Services Act) including any salt or ester of the active ingredient, as a single entity or in combination
with another active ingredient.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (1988).
7.
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In conjunction with § 156, the PTR addressed the distortion at
the back end of the patent period by providing for an exemption to
patent infringement. 9 Codified as 35 U.S.C.§ 271(e)(1), this exemption allows competitors, prior to the expiration of a patent, to engage
in otherwise infringing activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval. It is this exemption that has created so much confusion.
I. SCOPE OF § 271(e)(1)

The first point of confusion that has arisen with this exemption
is to what products does this law apply? In 1990, the Supreme Court
clarified this issue by stating that §271(e)(1) not only covers drugs
but also medical devices and food and color additives.' 0
The controversy behind the scope of this exemption was based
on the fact that as drafted, § 271(e)(1) appears to be limited exclusively to drugs." However, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,Inc., the
Federal Circuit held that the § 271(e)(1) exemption was not strictly
limited to drugs but also extends to medical devices that are subject
to FDA approval. 2 In the process of affirming this decision the Supreme Court broadened the scope of § 271(e)(1) even further. 13
The logic behind Eli Lilly was stated by Justice Scalia who
wrote that "the phrase 'patented invention' in § 271(e)(1) is defined
to include all inventions, not drug-related inventions alone."' 4 This is
because §271(e)(1) must be interpreted in light of § 156. Since
§ 156 covers human drug products, medical devices, and food and
color additives, so must §271(e)(1).
It was intended by Congress that §§ 156 and 271(e)(1) work together in alleviating the dual patent term distortions. For this reason,
they must be interpreted relative to each other rather than as independent provisions. 5 This is reflected by Justice Scalia in Eli Lilly:
[it seems most implausible to us that Congress, being demonstrably aware of the dual distorting effects of regulatory approval requirements in this entire area... should choose to address both
those distortions only for drug products; and for other products
named in §201 (35 USC §156) should enact provisions which not

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 662 (1990).
Id. at 662.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1988).
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
EliLilly, 496 U.S. at 662.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 666-69.
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only leave in place an anticompetitive restriction at the end of the
monopoly term but simultaneously expand the monopoly term itself, thereby not only failing to eliminate but16positively aggravating distortion of the 17-year patent protection.
As a result of this logic, the § 271(e)(1) exemption has been
found to apply not only to drugs, but also to medical devices, food
additives, color additives, and human biological products.
IV.

ELIGIBILITY UNDER

§ 271(e)(1)

Section 271(e)(1) focuses only on acts of infringement as defined in § 271(a), i.e., the accused act(s) must constitute making, using, selling, or offering to sell an infringing device.1 7 'If the accused
activity falls outside of these categories, it is a noninfringing act and
the exemption is not relevant." As a condition to eligibility, the accused activity must be solely for uses reasonably related to gaining
FDA approval.'9 Based on deviations from these concepts, patentees
have been quick to charge that accused infringers should be disqualified from the exemption. The courts have responded by holding that
an accused infringer is not disqualified from this exemption for intent
to commercialize prior to patent expiration, collateral uses of data
submitted to the FDA, foreign activity, or demonstrations of infringing devices at trade shows.
A. Infringer'sIntent To CommercializePriorTo Patent
Expiration
In Intermedics v. Ventritex, 0 it was argued that Congress intended § 271(e)(1) to apply only when the allegedly infringing manufacturer is preparing to commercialize after expiration of the patentn-suit.2' The district court did not approve of this limitation and held
that a proper § 271(e)(1) analysis objectively and exclusively focuses
on potentially infringing "acts" themselves, not the "intent" or
"purposes" behind these acts.'
The Intermedics court reached its ruling because it felt that the

16. Id. at 672.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
18. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished), cert. denied 115 S Ct. 205 (1994).

19. Id. at 1277-78.
.20. 775 F. Supp. 1269.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 1274.
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application of section 271(e)(1) should be kept simple and the addition of an "intent" element would inevitably convolute the issue. In
expressing this concern, it stated:
[W]e are troubled by the prospect of having to search for [intent]
in a corporate body or other business organization. Even with respect to natural persons, ascertaining subjective intent can be an

elusive and labor intensive exercise ....
We also fail to understand why the subjective state of mind of a party should be signifi-

cant in this setting. Surely Congress was not concerned about
clearing certain "unacceptable" thoughts or hopes or visions out of
certain persons' minds. Nor does the concept of "intent" become
substantially more attractive in this setting if it is "objectively" addressed ....
To apply such test it would be necessary to make

guesses about when FDA approval was likely to be forthcoming.
Yet the process of securing FDA approval for a new medical product can be torturously extended and riddled with unpredictability.3
The Federal Circuit affirmed this view on appeal and in further
support of it held that from a direct reading of the PTR Act, "tihere
is no suggestion that a producer may only rely on the exemption if it
does not intend to commercialize the product before expiration of the
patents,.., reliance on §271(e)(1) is not precluded by manifestation
of an intent to commercialize upon FDA approval."24
The courts have therefore concluded that "the law is not concerned.., with motives, purposes, or ulterior designs. Instead, the
law is concerned only with actual uses."
B. PublicDisseminationof ClinicalData:Promotionaland
FundraisingUses
Noninfringing collateral uses of clinical data generated primarily for FDA approval do not affect the application of § 271(e)(1). A
company therefore does not lose this exemption by disseminating its
clinical data for uses other than submission to the FDA.26 These collateral uses include business activities such as raising capital and establishing mechanisms for product distribution.
In Intermedics, the district court emphasized that § 271(e)(1) is
not relevant to activities, commercial or otherwise, that are not in-

23.

Id.

24. Intemedics Inc. v. Ventritex Co. Inc., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (unpublished).

25. Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1285.
26. Id. at 1278.
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fringing under § 27 1(a).27 As stated above infringing activity must
constitute making, using, selling, or offering to sell an infringing device.28 Since dissemination of FDA data does not literally fall into
one of these categories, the Federal Circuit has held that there is no
infringement when disclosure is made for fundraising and other business purposes.29 Such purposes include "presenting clinical trial data
at professional conferences, reporting clinical trial progress to investors, analysts and journalists, and describing clinical trial results in
private fundraising memoranda."3
Congress's intent in enacting this exemption was "to create a legal environment in which the potential competitors of patent holders
would be free, through non-infringing activities like raising capital,
to position themselves to enter the market in a commercially significant way just as soon as the relevant patents expired. '31 Meaningful
sales require more than just FDA approval; to be successful, competitors need to engage in promotional activities to raise funds for
developing and testing their products. When Congress drafted
§ 271(e)(1), it had this in mind. The Federal Circuit reflected this
sentiment in Telectronics PacingSystems v. Ventritex.32 In its opinion, the court stated that:
[Lit would strain credulity to imagine that Congress was indifferent
to the economics of developing and marketing drugs and medical
devices when it enacted § 271(e)(1). ...
if Congress intended to
make that more difficult, if not impossible, by preventing competitors from using in an admittedly non-infringing manner, the
derived test data for fund raising and other business purposes, it
would have made that intent clear.33
Collateral business uses of FDA clinical data have therefore
been held to be irrelevant in a proper § 27 l(e)(1) analysis. As long
as the data is primarily generated for regulatory approval, subsequent
27.
28.
29.

m

at 1281.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988).
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

30. Id.
31. Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1279.
32. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In
this case, defendant used the clinical data submitted to the FDA for promotional purposes.
Some of Ventritex's clinical investigators submitted an abstract to the American College of
Cardiology and presented results of the clinical trials at medical conferences. Furthermore, in

a fund raising effort, Ventritex's CEO described the on-going clinical trial to investors, analysts, and journalists. He also distributed a handout which stated "Early clinical results are

quite promising."
33.

Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1524.
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uses of it for business purposes will not destroy the § 271(e)(1) exemption. In the minds of the Federal Circuit, Congress did not intend
to repeal the exemption in the event that data obtained during clinical
trials is publicly disclosed for promotional and business purposes.34
C. DemonstrationsofInfringingDevices at TradeShows
Because of the commercial nature of trade shows, the presence
of infringing devices exempted under §271(e)(1) is a troublesome
matter. The courts, however, have held that so long as the trade show
displays are reasonably related to obtaining information for FDA approval, and they are not done to advance actual sales of the products,
they do not disrupt the infringement exemption.
In Telectronics,the court legitimized the trade show displays by
finding that demonstrations of infringing devices "constitute an exempted use reasonably related to FDA approval." 35 An important
consideration with FDA clinical trials is the need to obtain clinical
investigators who in turn can generate data to be submitted to the
FDA. "[B]ecause device sponsors are responsible for selecting qualified investigators and providing them with the necessary information
to conduct clinical testing," the court recognized the necessity for
such demonstrations and displays. 36 Demonstrations at trade shows
are therefore deemed to be reasonably related to the development of
information for FDA approval. As such, it is an exempted activity
under § 271(e)(1).
Subsequent to its decision in Telectronics, the Federal Circuit
affirmed Intermedics in an unpublished opinion. 37 In doing so, it endorsed trade show displays and demonstrations from a different angle. The district court held that "demonstration of an accused device
does not constitute an act of infringement unless the 'totality of the
circumstances' also reveals concurrent 'sales oriented' activity which
results in, or at least substantially advances, an actual sale of the accused device." 3 "[M]ere demonstration or display of an accused
product, even in an obviously commercial atmosphere, does not constitute an infringing use under § 271(a)."' 39 The Federal Circuit was
more than willing to agree in stating that "assuming these nonsale
34. Id. at 1523.
35.

Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1523.

36.

Id..

37.

Intermedics, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524.

38. Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1286.
39. Id.
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demonstrations at medical conferences constitute an infringing use,
we have previously held they are an exempt use that is reasonably
related to procuring FDA approval of the device.' 4°
After Intermedics, the Federal Circuit affirmed a similar case in
an unpublished opinion called Chartex International v. M.D. Personal Products.4 The Chartex decision cites Telectronics and holds
that trade show displays to obtain necessary information for clinical
testing are exempted activity under § 271(e)(1). This is because they
are reasonably related to obtaining information for FDA approval.42
The general rule is therefore reiterated in that the use of clinical data
for more than FDA approval does not revoke the infringement exemption.
D. Foreign Uses
The question of whether § 271(e)(1) applies to foreign-related
activities is a matter that is currently unresolved due to the lack of
any precedential Federal Circuit review. District courts appear unsettled as to how narrowly or broadly to construe §27 1(e)(1).
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundationv. Baxter Travenol
Laboratories,Inc.,43 a district court in Delaware heard a case where
the defendant had submitted the data it generated not only to the
FDA, but also to equivalent agencies in foreign countries."
The
court sought to determine whether Baxter's activities were "solely for
purposes reasonably related to" FDA approval of Factor VIII:C.
There were, however, unanswered factual questions as to "what data
was sent to the European agencies, what data developed in Europe
was given to the FDA, and what tests were required by FDA regulations. ' 45 Because of these factual questions, the court was unable to
resolve the foreign activity issue.4 6

In Intermedics,the district court of northern California held that
"defendants' use of clinical data to support foreign import applications and defendants' publication of articles describing features of the

40. Intermedics, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1524.
41. Chartex Int'l PLC. v. M.D. Personal Prod. Corp., 5 F.3d 1505, 1993 WL 306169
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished).
42. Chartex, 1993 WL 306169 at *3.
43. Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1562 (D. Del. 1988).
44. Id at 1564.
45. Id. at 1565.
46. Id.
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[product] are not otherwise infringing acts under § 271(a). 47 In this
case, testing activities conducted in Germany were found to be reasonably related to generating data for submission to the FDA. In this
jurisdiction, it appears that the submission of foreign-generated clinical data is exempted so long as the procedures used in compiling the
data comply with FDA requirements. 8
In Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. v. Smith,4 9 the court out of the

eastern district of Pennsylvania held that uses of a patented invention
not "solely for purposes reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under Federal Law which regulates the
manufacture, use or sale of drugs" is an act of infringement.5 0 The
court noted that § 271(e)(1) does not permit other uses, such as obtaining foreign premarketing approval and any promotional or commercial use in the U.S. or abroad.5 1 The court enjoined Ortho from
transmitting to any foreign affiliate or third party any data based on
the manufacture, use or sale of norgestimate. It examined Johnson &
Johnson's and Ortho's use of domestically made norgestimate, and
concluded that this use was not protected under § 271(e)(1). 2 It appears that the injunction was intentionally worded to cover even the
dissemination of data which had to be developed anyway to satisfy
FDA.
In NeoRx Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc.,53 a district court out of
New Jersey emphasized once again that §271(e)(1) only requires that
the making, using, or selling of the patented invention be solely for
uses reasonably related to FDA approval.5 4 It held that the commercial motivation of trying to obtain foreign regulatory approval does
not necessarily deprive defendant of the § 271(e)(1) exemption.55
Submitting data to foreign regulatory agencies is not a per se infringing act. However, using the data to serve multiple purposes unrelated to meeting FDA requirements will put the defendant beyond
the protection of §271 (e)(l). 6
In Chartex v. Int'l PLC v. M.D. PersonalProd. Corp., the court
47.
48.
49.

Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
Id. at 1284.
Ortho Pharm. Corp.v. Smith, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1977 (E.D. Pa. 1990).

50. Id. at 1992.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53.

NeoRx Corp.v. Immunomedics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 202 (D. N.J. 1994)

54. Id. at 207.
55.

Id. at 206.

56. Id. at 207.
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of the northern district of California held that "making arrangements
to have a device manufactured overseas or making arrangements to
have it imported into a foreign country is not an infringing 'making,'
'using,' or 'selling' of the invention within the United States. 5 7
Therefore, the defendant's overseas business arrangements did not
constitute infringement.58
Aside from affirming the district court decision in Intermedics,
the Federal Circuit has not yet resolved the issue of whether foreign
uses of the data submitted for FDA approval is within the scope of
protection under § 271(e)(1). The focus of the courts' inquiry, however, seems to be whether the foreign use was "solely" for and
"reasonably related" to obtaining FDA approval.
V.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN LIGHT OF

§ 271(e)(1)

As currently applied by the courts, § 271 (e)(1) has also changed
the role played by declaratory judgments in patent law. Patentees
who wish to take action against those protected by this exemption
now face an exposure to a declaratory judgment of invalidity. This
threat to patent owners has essentially put teeth into the exemption.
Declaratory actions provide a method whereby the respective
rights of both patent owners and alleged infringers can be established.59 Such relief can afford parties a quick, practical, and inexpensive means for resolving their conflicts.6" A court, however, is
not justified in hearing such an action unless the party seeking it can
show a "true and actual controversy." 6' If the plaintiff is a potential
infringer, there are two elements necessary to demonstrate the required showing: (1) the defendant's conduct must have given the
plaintiff a reasonable apprehension of a charge of infringement, and
(2) the plaintiff must be engaged in infringing acts or have the ability
and intention to engage in such acts. 62 If the plaintiff is the patent
holder, a "true and actual" controversy can be found if the defendant
is engaged in infringing activity and apparently refuses to alter the
activity despite acts by the patent owner sufficient to create a reason57. Chartex Int'l PLC v. M.D. Personal Prod. Corp. 5 F.3d 1505, 1993 WL 306169, *3
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished).
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Lang v. Pacific Marine and Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
60. See, e.g., Smith v. Transit Casualty Co., 281 F. Supp. 661, 670 (Fed. Cir. 1968).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil
Co., 312 U.S. 270,272 (1941).
62. See, e.g., Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed.

Cir. 1988).
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able apprehension that a suit will be forthcoming. 63 In either case,
the party seeking declaratory relief generally has to demonstrate immediacy before a court has jurisdiction to hear its complaint.6
The Federal Circuit has recently reconciled these tests with
the § 271(e)(1) exemption.65 In both Intermedics and Telectronics,
patentees' declaratory judgment actions were denied because of an
insufficient case of controversy. 66 The logic behind these rulings was
that if the infringing activity was to be specifically allowed under the
§ 271(e)(1) exemption, it would be inconsistent to apply a declaratory action aimed at prohibiting it. "To permit Ventritex to be protected from direct suit of infringement and yet allow the same activities to be subject to suit in a declaratory judgment action would be
nonsensical."'67 Accordingly, the court in Intermedics denied the patentee's request for declaratory judgment despite the fact that the defendant admitted its intent to market its infringing device as soon as
it received FDA approval (a nonexempted activity). 68 As a result, the
door has been closed on the use of declaratory actions by patentees
with regards to § 271(e)(1).
Section 271(e)(1) has also been used by the courts to define the
declaratory relief available to potential infringers. 69 In Farmaceutisk,
a patent action was brought by a patentee against an infringer whose
activity was protected under § 271(e)(1).
The defendant counterclaimed with declaratory actions for both noninfringement and patent
invalidity. Since the defendant's activity was clearly exempted, both
the plaintiffs suit and the defendant's declaratory action for noninfringement were thrown out. 70 Of critical importance, however, was
the fact that the court allowed the defendant's declaratory action for
patent validity. The court's reasoning was based on the following
policy reasons:
[P]ermitting new drug manufacturers, at their choosing and subject
to court discretion, to test validity of a patent-in-issue early on in

63. See, e.g., Lang, 895 F.2d at 764.
64. See, e.g., Farmaceutisk Laboratorium Ferring v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1344, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
65. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 205 (1994);
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
66. Intermedics,26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1527, Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1526.
67. Intermedics, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1528.

68. Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1275.
69.
70.

Farmaceutisk,25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1344.
Id. at 1351-52.
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the development process best serves the competing interests of
protecting valid patents, protecting new drug manufacturers during
71
the testing process, and moving alternative drugs into the market.
The functional effect of this ruling is the expansion of benefits
provided to infringers who are protected by § 27 1(e)(1). Patent holders now must seriously contemplate the strategic implications of attacking potentially exempted activity. Bringing an infringement suit
provides the defendant with a prima facie "true and actual controversy" that he might not otherwise have been able to demonstrate.
As a result, this conduct would likely give the defendant the grounds
upon which he could seek declaratory relief. Patent owners who
bring suit attacking a potentially exempted activity under § 271(e)(1)
should therefore be weary of bringing such a suit. They just may be
exposing their patents to declaratory rulings of invalidity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 271(e)(1) is intended to remedy the distortion of the patent term produced by the requirement that certain products must receive premarket regulatory approval. This enables competitors to effectively enter the market on the day the relevant patent(s) expire. As
it currently stands, § 271(e)(1) is not limited to drugs but extends to
other products that are subject to FDA approval. Intent and collateral
uses of FDA clinical data and infringing devices apparently do not
disqualify infringers from the exemption. In light of this, patentees
should be weary of bringing infringement suits against those eligible
for § 271(e)(1). Such conduct may just expose them to declaratory
judgments of invalidity.
On a final note, it is important to address the fact that there is
very limited precedence dealing with this exemption. The Federal
Circuit has yet to completely clarify the precise §cope and application
of § 271(e)(1). Until such precedential opinions are issued, those
dealing with § 271(e)(1) should proceed with caution.

71.

Id.

